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U.S. INTEREST ALLOCATION
RULES: EFFECTS AND POLICY
ABSTRACT
One of the important changes of the 1986 tax reform forU.S. multinationals is related to
the allocation of interest expense. Prior to 1986, U.S. companiesallocated domestic interest
expense to the income of foreignaffiliates on a non-consolidated basis according to the
distribution of gross income or assets. After 1986, a U.S.multinational is required to allocate
domestic interest expense on a consolidated basis according tothe distribution of U.S. and
foreign assets.
We analyze the impact of the new interest allocation rules onthe financial and investment
decisions of U.S. multinationals using data from a survey ofmultinationals assembled by Price
Waterhouse. We find that the allocation of interest expense increasesthe marginal cost of U.S.
debt by about 38 percent for firms with excess foreign taxcredits. Our empirical tests suggest
that firms have altered the location of their borrowingsin response to the new rules. We also
find that the requirement to allocate interest expense has a significant impacton the effective tax
rate faced by U.S. multinationals. For U.S. domesticinvestments, the interest allocation rules
increase the U.S. effective rate from 17.6 percent to 21.9 percent.The rules also increase the
effective tax rates on foreign investments made by U.S. firms.
Rosanne Altshuler Jack Mintz
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In 1986, the U.S. government undertook a significantreform of its income tax system.
Among the many changes were those made tothe tax treatment of foreign source income of U.S.
multinationals. Included in the tax reform were new rulesfor the calculation of foreign source
income, foreign tax credits and the allocationof costs between foreign and domestic sources.
One of the important changes of this reform isrelated to the allocation of interest
expense. Prior to 1986, U.S. companiesallocated U.S.-source interest expense incurred by their
domestic members to the income of foreign affiliates on anoncorisoIidated basis according to
the distribution of gross income or assets. After 1986, aU.S. multinational is required to
allocate domestic interest expense to U.S. and foreign source grossincome on a consolidated
basis according to the distribution of U.S. and foreign assets.The intent of this and other
policies directed towards the tax treatmentof foreign source income was to prevent the erosion
of the U.S. corporate tax revenue base that wouldresult from multinationals shifting expense
to the United States. However, by increasingthe U.S. tax on U.S. source income, the outcome
of these policies may have affected the competitivenessof U.S. multinationals vis-a-vis other
foreign multinationals located in countries wheresimilar rules have not been adopted.'
This work analyzes the impact of the new U.S. interestallocation rules on the financial
and investment decisions of U.S. multinational corporations.2The paper is divided into four
'As discussed below, the U.S. allocation rules for interestdeductions have raised the cost
of financing operations by U.S. debt and the costof capital for U.S. multinationals makingthem
less competitive relative to domestic corporations.
2Earlier studies of the interest allocation rules includeCollins and Shackelford (1992),
Andrus (1988), and Froot & Hines (1994).2
additional sections. Section 2 provides a background discussionof the impact of interest
allocation rules on financing and investment decisions of U.S. companies.Section 3 reports the
results of empirical tests regarding the impact of U.S. interestallocation rules on the financing
of U.S. parent and subsidiary operations.3 Section 4 examinesthe potential impact of interest
allocation rules on the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals and presentscalculations of
effective tax rates for investments at home and abroad taking the interestallocation rules into
account. Conclusions are contained in section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
As mentioned above, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (hereafter, TRA'86) altered theU.S.
rules for the allocation of interest to domestic and foreign source income. Underlyingthe
interest allocation rules is the theory that the debt of multinational corporations is fungible across
jurisdictions.4 In this section, we review the law related to interest allocation, and discuss,in
theoretical terms, its impact on the financing and investment decisions of U.S.multinationals.5
2. 1Interest Allocation Rules
The interest allocation rules contained in TRA'86 resulted in three primary changes:
3Since our data comes from foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies, we focus on the
interest allocation rules concerning this form of foreign affiliate organization. Special rules
apply to the allocation of interest expense for foreign branches.
4Note that full fungibility was not adopted in 1986. Debt of the U.S. group, and interest
thereon, is allocated to income received from foreign affiliates even if the foreignaffiliates are
self-financed, i.e. the debt of foreign affiliates is disregarded.
5A good description of the tax law concerning the allocation of interest expense is contained
in Froot and Hines (1994).3
i.One taxpayer concett for affiliated companies: Prior to 1986, companies in an affiliated
U.S. group couldapportioninterest expense between domestic and foreign sources on a separate
company basis. After 1986, U.S. multinationals are required to aggregateaffiliated company
income and interest expense to calculate interest for the purpose of taxing foreign and domestic
source income. A company is affiliated to a group if 80 percent of its voting stock or 80 percent
of the total value of outstanding stock is held directly or indirectly by includible corporations.
One impact of this provision is that it is much more difficult, perhaps impossible, for parents
to avoid the allocation of interest expense to foreign source income simply by isolating debtin
a single affiliated domestic subsidiary which has no foreign source income.
ii. Asset allocation: Prior to 1986, multinationals had the option to allocate domestic interest
expense under either the gross incomemethod6 (i.e. ratable to amounts of foreign source and
domestic source income) or the asset method (assets were measured according to "fair market
value" or "tax book value").7 Since 1986, companies must allocate domestic interest expense
according to the distribution of assets held by the parent in domestic and foreignaffiliates.
Therefore the ratio of foreign assets to worldwide assets determines the percentageof interest
expense that must be allocated abroad. Domestic assetsinclude business assets held by the U.S.
affiliated group which produce U.S. source income, while foreign assets of theU.S. affiliated
6Both prior to and after 1986, interest expense on certain non-recourse debtcould be
allocated entirely against the income generated by the secured asset.
7Tax book value is generally equal to the original cost of assets less depreciationallowed for
tax purposes.4
group include foreign branch assetsand affiliated foreign company equity (stock and accumulated
earnings and profits).
iii. The netting ruk: The netting rule is related to U.S. parent financingof subsidiary debt.
The rule is intended to prevent taxpayers from replacing third-party debtof foreign affiliates
with debt to the U.S. group, an otherwise available 'self-help techniquefor achieving
worldwide fungibility. Under the netting rule, interest incurred on third-party debt issued by
the U.S. members may be attributed directly to foreign source interest on debt held bythe parent
in affiliated foreign companies. The amount of domestic interest expense allocated to foreign
source income is determined by the relationship of debt as a ratio of assetsfor the subsidiary and
parent. In particular, if the parent's ratio of third-party debt to assetsis more than 80 percent
of the foreign affiliate group's debt/asset ratio, then the excess interest on debt will be allocated
to foreign source income. The netting rules have been modified fundamentally on two
occasions since their original promulgation in 1987.
2.2Tax Impact of the Interest Allocation Rules
The allocation of interest to foreign source income need not affect the amount of U.S.
tax paid by the U.S. multinational.The impact depends on the position of the U.S.
multinational vis-a-vis its payment of tax on foreign source income. U.S. multinationals are
subject to taxation on both U.S. and foreign source income. A company is subject to U.S. taxes
This ratio test was the second iteration of the rule, since replaced by a third version which
"triggers" if there has been an increase in U.S. group debtan increase in U.S. group loans
to foreign affiliates.5
on actual and deemed dividends from foreign subsidiariesbut is allowed a credit, subject to
limitation, for withholdingtaxes paid andincometaxesdeemed tobe paidwith respect to these
dividends. Ifthe foreigntaxcredit is less thantheU.S. tax on remitted income, the U.S.
multinationalwill pay U.S. tax equal to the difference between the two amounts. This is the so-
called "excess limitation" case.9 If the potential foreign tax credit is more than theU.S. tax
source income.'0 In this case, the multinational
more available credits than it can use in a given
tax credit position. In particular, when the U.S.multinational is in an excess limitation position,
the interest allocation rule has no impact on the U.S. company. Althoughallocated U.S. source
interest may decrease foreign source income, the reduced U.S. tax liability onforeign source
income compensates for the increased U.S. tax liability on domestic sourceincome. However,
when the company is in an excess credit situation, the allocationof U.S. source interest expense
9Alternatively, this is called the deficient tax credit case.
Foreign tax credits can be carried back for two yearsand carried forward for five years.
However, under current U.S. tax law, unused credits arenot carried forward at a rate of
interest.
liability, there is no U.S. tax owing on foreign
is in an "excess credit" position because it has
year.
The foreign tax credit thus is limited to
source income (in the "excess limitation" case)
credit" case). As a result of this limitation
allocation rules may have an important impact
the lesserof foreign income tax paid on foreign
or U.S. tax duebeforecredit (inthe "excesstax
on the use of foreign tax credits, the interest
ona U.S. multinational depending on its foreign6
to foreign source income decreases theU.S. tax paid on foreign source income (the limitation)
and thus increases the amount of tax paid on domestic sourceincome.t
This argument can be presented more formally as follows. Let t*F*be foreign tax paid
at the rate t on foreign source income defined bythe foreign authority (F*).12 Let tF be the
U.S. tax paid at the rate t on foreign source income F asdefined under U.S. rules. As
discussed above, the U.S. multinational is given a foreign tax credit equal tothe lesser of t*F*
or tF. Further, let D be domestic source income (beforethe deduction of interest) and I be U.S.
source interest expense.
When the company is in excess limitation, it receives a foreign tax creditof t*F* and its
aggregate tax on domestic and foreign source income withoutinterest allocation is the following:
T =t(D-I)+ tF -t*F*
=t(D+F-I)-t*F* (1)
When interest is allocated abroad, a portion is deductible against domestic source incomeand
the balance against foreign source income as defined by the U.S. authorities (note onlythe U.S.
tax liability, not the foreign tax paid to other authorities, is affected by the amountof interest
allocated abroad). Let a be the portion of interest expense allocated to foreign source income.
Thus, for excess limitation corporations, total tax paid with interest allocationremains constant:
T =t[D-(l-a)I]+ t(F-al) -t*F*
This loss of foreign tax credits may only be temporary due to credit carryforwards.
However, since foreign tax carryforwards do not earn interest they are worthless than foreign
tax credits that can be claimed either in the current period or through carrybacks.
'2Under U.S. rules, companies pooi sources of foreign income into "baskets". Thus, t' may
be thought of as an average tax rate imposed on aggregate foreign source income in thebasket
in question.7
=t(D+F-l)-t*F* (2)
The allocation of interest increases U.S. tax paid on domestic source income (by the amount tal)
in favor of a reduction in U.S. tax paid by the same amount (taT). Thus, as long as theU.S.
multinational maintains its excess limitation position after the allocation of interest, thereis no
impact of interest allocation on the tax paid by the parent company.
On the other hand, if the U.S. multinational is in an excess credit position,the foreign
tax credit is limited to the U.S. tax on foreign source income, tF.The amount of tax paid,
without allocation of interest, is the following:
T =t(D-I)+ tF -tF=t(D-L) (3)
With the allocation of interest expense to foreign source income, the U.S. company's tax liability
will be the following:
T =t[D-(1-a)I]+ t(F-al) -t(F-aI)
=t[D-(1-a)I] (4)
Effectively, the role of the interest allocation rule is to reducethe amount of U.S. interest
expense that corporations in excess credit positions candeduct against total income.'3
To what extent do interest allocation rules impact on the taxes paid bymultinationals?
Earlier work by Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newton (1993) suggestthat many
'3Note that if the U.S. government gave a refundable tax credit when foreign taxes aremore
than U.S. tax liabilities on foreign source income, then the allocationrule would have no impact
on the amount of tax owing. Allocated interest expensewould reduce U.S. tax liabilities and
increase the amount of the tax refund. Of course, the U.S. governmentdoes not give a refund
for excess foreign taxes paid in order to protect its revenue baseand avoid subsidizing high tax
rates in foreign countries.8
u.s.multinationalswere in excess credit positions in the mid-1980s)4 Thus, interest allocation
rules would be expected to have at least some effect on U.S. companies)5
Almost all of the 17 large multinational companies surveyed by Price Waterhousefor this
project reported that the interest allocation rules had at least some impact ontheir decisions)'
Twelve companies reported that the "one taxpayer" rule had a major impactwhile three
companies reported a moderate impact. The asset-apportionment rulehad a major impact on
nine companies and a moderate impact on five companies. The netting rule had a major impact
on two companies, a moderate impact on three companies and no impact on eight companies.
Thus, the "one taxpayer" and asset-apportionment rules were the most importantin their impact
on the surveyed multinationals.
2.3Impact on Behavior
There are a number of expected effects of the interest allocation rules on the behavior
of the U.S. multinational when it is in the excess tax credit case. One obvious impact of the
new rules is for the U.S. multinational to reduce U.S. interest expense to mitigate thedirect
effects of interest allocation. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including substituting
preferred equity for debt, deconsolidating highly leveraged domestic subsidiaries, and reducing
parent debt.
4Hines and Hubbard (1990) present statistics on foreign tax credit positions of U.S.
multinational corporations using tax return information from 1984. Altshuler and Newlon (1993)
calculated foreign tax credit positions using similar data from 1986.
'51t is more likely that multinationals will find themselves in excess credit positions after
1986 since TRA'86 lowered the statutory U.S. tax rate from 46 to 34 percent.
"Section 3 contains a description of the dataset assembled from this survey.9
Alternatively, the U.S. multinational can shift financing offshore by reducingdebt of the
U.S. group and increasing borrowing by foreign affiliates. Moreover, since onlythe equity held
by foreign affiliates is included in the allocation formula, ashift to foreign debt reduces the
percentage of remaining interest expense allocated to foreign sourceincome.'7 At the same
time, a shift to debt held by subsidiaries reduces foreign sourceincome and corporate taxes paid
to foreign jurisdictions. Depending on corporate tax rates, interest rates,and other factors, this
may result in the multinational movingfrom an excess tax credit position to an excess limitation
position so that interest allocation rules no longer matter (althoughshould such a shift occur, the
multinational pays some U.S. tax, in excess of foreign tax credits, on foreign source income).
There are, however, other expected effects on behavior. One important impactwould
be on investment. More U.S interest expense is allocated to foreign sourceincome when the
subsidiary undertakes new investments abroad. Thus, interestallocation can increase the
effective tax rate on foreign investments. Similarly, foreign subsidiaries candivest ownership
of assets and reduce the amount of allocated interest expense.
Increased capital investment in the U.S. also reduces the amount ofinterest expense
allocated abroad. However, to the extent that the U.S.-Iocated investmentmust be financed in
part by U.S. debt, the interest allocationrules will increase the effective tax rate on U.S.
investments as well (see the technical appendix).
In the next section, we test the impact of interest allocation rules onthe financing of U.S.
multinational operations. In section 4, we measure the impact of interestallocation rules on the
'7Note, however, that assets rather than equity are usedfor allocating interest expense for
branches. Even foreign corporations operating in the U.S.with branches must allocate U.S.
interest expense abroad in calculating U.S. tax liabilities.10
effective tax rates for domestic and foreign investments made byU.S. companies and compare
these to alternative policies for the tax treatment of U.S. interest expense.
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The previous section discusses the impact of the 1986 changes in the interest allocation
rules on the investment and financing decisions of U.S. multinational corporations.The
theoretical model developed in the technical appendix shows that the interest allocation rules
raise the cost of financing operations by U.S. debt for multinationals in excess credit positions.
This increased cost of U.S. debt provides multinationals with incentives to alter theirfinancial
structure and investment decisions. Collins and Shackelford (1992) provide evidencethat firms
increased their issuance of preferred stock in response to TRA'86. Froot and Hines (1993)
provide preliminary evidence that the new interest allocation rules have reduced borrowingand
investment by multinationals in-excess credit positions. In this section, we use data from the
Price Waterhouse survey mentioned above to explore the possibility suggested by the theory that
multinationals have substituted borrowing abroad for U.S. debt. In addition, we investigate
whether the 1986 changes in the interest allocation rules have led to lower overall debt levels
for the multinationals in our sample.
3.1Data description
Data on the location of the debt of U.S. multinationals is extremely difficult to obtain.
Although data from Compustat does contain some information on the foreign operationsof
corporations, the Geographic Segmental File of Compustat does not report information on debtIt
held abroad in foreign affihiates. Information from tax returns is difficult to access and is not
adequate for our project. The information returns filed bycontrolled foreign corporations (Form
5471) do contain some balance sheet information. However,information on the ratio of foreign
to worldwide assets (which is necessary to calculate the percentageof U.S. interest expense that
must be allocated abroad) and foreign to worldwide debt (whichis necessary to determine the
impact of the tax rules on the location of borrowing)is not available from tax return data.'9
We were able to obtain much of the information necessary for our analysis from a survey
of U.S. multinationals organized by Price Waterhouse. The survey containsinformation from
corporate tax returns, subsidiary information returnsand annual reports. The information from
corporate tax returns allows us to calculate foreign taxcredit positions. The data from the
annual reports provides us with a breakdown of U.S. and foreign debtand assets. In addition,
the data from the subsidiary information forms allows us to calculatedebt to asset ratios for
operations in three countries: Canada, Japan and theU.K. The data appendix contains a
detailed description of the dataset.
The drawback of this dataset is its size. The survey was sent to25 multinational
corporations. Only 13 parent corporations in thenon-financial sector returned the survey to
Price Waterhouse and only four years of data are available: 1986, 1988,1990 and 1991 •20
'81naddition, for many corporations the few foreign variablesthat are reported are
aggregated by geographic region.
'9This is the case either because the data in question is not reported onthe tax and
information returns or is not recorded on the dataset assembled fromthe tax and information
returns.
20Since financial corporations generally face different tax rules weeliminated them from our
analysis. This reduced the sample from 17 to 13 corporations.12
However, since the interest allocation rules that we are interested in studyingdid not take effect
until after 1986, we can use this dataset to study how the financial structure of parents and
subsidiaries has changed since 1986.
Table 1 presents some summary statistics taken from annual reports for the 13 non-
financial corporations in our sample. As mentioned above, these firms are extremely large in
terms of asset sizein 1991, they reported average worldwide assets of 67 billion dollars (68
percent of which were U.S.). Worldwide debt to asset ratios rangefrom about 21 percent in
1986 to about 36 percent in 1991. U.S. debt to asset ratios were quite similar ranging from
approximately 20 percent in 1988 to 36 percent in 1991. An increasing fraction of the pre-tax
income of these firms is from foreign sources: from 55 percent in 1986 to 83 percent in
1991.21 Tax payments on worldwide income averaged about 1 billion per year while U.S. tax
payments averaged about 325 million per year over the sample period. Finally note that the
U.S. interest expense of our sample firms more than doubled from 1986 to 1991. During the
same time, worldwide interest expense tripled. The remainder of this section explores the extent
to which the new interest allocation rules have contributed to this trend.
3.2The Geo2raphic Distribution of Borrowing after TRA'86
We start by calculating the foreign tax credit positions of the 13 non-financial
corporations in the dataset. Since the interest allocation rules only affect those multinationals
in excess credit positions, it is natural to separate the firms by credit position and look for
differences in financial structure after 1986. Over 60 percent of the firms were in excess credit
2tPre-tax income is net of interest expense.13
positions in each sample year. Nine firms in 1986 and eightfirms in 1988 were in excess credit
positions. In 1990,ninefirms had excess credits and by 1991 there were ten firms with excess
credits.
We also looked at the extent to which parent corporations in our sample remained in the
same credit position for all four sample years. Allof the parent corporations were in excess
credit positions for at least one sample year and only two firms were in excesslimitation
positions for three of the four years. The remaining elevenfirms are partitioned as follows:
three were in excess credits for all four years and the remaining eight spenteither two or three
years in excess credits. Thisdistribution suggests that all of the firms in our sample were
impacted by the changes in the interest allocation rules.
Table 2 presents foreign subsidiary and parent specific debt and assetinformation
averaged over the four sample years. Our theory predicts thatmultinationals with excess credits
should have lower levels of U.S. debt and higher levels of foreign debtrelative to worldwide
debt than those in excess limitation positions. This table presents some supportiveevidence.
To construct the table we first calculated the average proportionof total debt accounted for by
debt in the U.S., Canada, Japan, and the U.K. for all of thefirms in the sample. We then
partitioned the data by credit states: all observationsassociated with parents in excess credit
(limitation) positions are averaged separately. Unfortunately, onlyeight of the thirteen non-
financial corporations reported information on U.S. debt.
Table 2 shows that U.S. debt accounts for almost three-quartersof worldwide debt (71.9
percent). The three countries for which data wereavailable make up, on average, from 7.5
Six spent three years in excess credits and two spent two years in excesscredits.14
percent (Japan) to 11.5 percent (U.K.)of overall debt. These country-specific averages show
an interesting pattern. U.S. debtmakes up a lower proportion of overall debt for parents with
excess credits. Similarly, these parentshold a higher proportion of debt in each of the three
countries than those parents in excess limitation positions?Although these results are
consistent with the predictions of our model, they do not offerconclusive evidence of an impact
of interest allocation rules on financial behavior. The results may simplybe due to a positive
correlation between excess credit status and assets abroad ---inother words, firms with excess
credits may have higher levels of assets and debt abroad for reasonsthat are not related to
interest allocation.
Table 2 also presents statistics on the ratio of foreign assets net of foreigndebt (FA) to
worldwide assets net of foreign debt (WWA) used to determine the proportionof U.S. interest
expense that must by allocated abroad. Foreigndebt is calculated by subtracting U.S. debt from
worldwide debt. Therefore we can only calculate this ratio for the eight firms in our samplethat
reported figures for U.S. debt. The average value of FA/WWAfor all firms is almost 35
percent.Parents with excess credit tend to have a higher fraction of assets locatedabroad
about 38 percent.24 This suggests that an additional dollar of U.S. interest generates a
deduction of 62 cents for these firms.
The difference between the means for the parents in the two credit positions was
statistically significant at a ten percent confidence level for debt in U.K. as afraction of
worldwide debt and the sum of debt in the three countries as a fraction of worldwide debt.
The difference in means of FAIWWA for the parents in the two credit positions was
statistically significant at the ten percent level.15
The last row of table 2 contains a rough estimate of the average cost of interest allocation
over the sample period. To calculate this figure we multiplied reported U.S. interest expense
by FA/WWA for each observation with excess credits. The resulting dollar amount represents
the effective loss of interest deductions in the U.S.a We find that the average cost of interest
allocation for firms in our sample is about 402 million dollars per year. Multiplying by a
combined federal and state corporate statutory rate of 0.38 gives an average increase in tax
payments of 153 million dollars per company.26 This represents50 percent of average U.S.
tax payments, per company with excess credits, over the four sample years.
Averaging over the four years of data may hide adjustments in financial structure
influenced by changes in the interest allocation rules. In table 3, we contrast debt ratios for
1986 with those for 1990. The 1991 data is not used for this table since it contains only two
parents in excess limitation7 Recall that the 1990 datacontains three parents in excess
limitation and is therefore better suited to our analysis.
Table 3 shows that the ratio of U.S. to worldwide debt increased from 1986 to 1990 for
all parents. However, the increase in U.S. debt relative to worldwide debt was smallerfor those
Recall that these allocated interest expenses are not allowed as deductions by host
countries.
26See appendix table 1 for combined state and federal corporate statutory tax rates forthe
sample years. This is a rough estimate since the U.S. statutory ratesvaried over the four sample
years. In addition, it does not tale foreign taxcredit carrybacks or carryforwards into account.
The estimate would be lower if the firms with excess credits in our sampleclaimed their credit
carryovers.
2Furthermore, only one of the two firms in excess limitation in 1991 had appropriatedata
to calculate the ratio of U.S. to worldwide debt.16
parents with excess credits.2 During the same time period thefraction of debt in Japan grew
for excess credit firms and decreased for excess limitation firms. The fraction of debt in the
U.K. decreased for both sets of firms but more so for those firms in excess limitation positions.
While these results are suggestive, we have not yet controlled for other factors besides interest
allocation that may explain the changes in the distribution of debt across these three countries.
We do this in the regression analysis below.
Table 3 presents an additional piece of evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that
firms impacted by the interest allocation rules have substituted foreign debt for U.S. debt.
Notice that the ratio of foreign assets to worldwide assets has increased for excess credit
firms. An increase in foreign debt would be consistent with this result.
The focus so far has been on the allocation of debt across countries. Tables 4 and 5give
information on the capital structure of operations abroad, at home, and worldwide, and present
calculations of the growth of debt between 1986 and 1991 relative to assets in 1986. In contrast
to the previous tables, we now divide firms based on their four-year history of foreign tax credit
positions.3° We contrast the three parents that were in an excess credit position for all four
years with the ten parents that were in an excess limitation position for at least one year.
Table 4 presents evidence that growth rates of debt at home and abroad differed for these
two groups of multinationals. The growth rate of U.S. debt relative to assets in the U.S. in
211n 1990,thedifference between the mean value of U.S. debt as a fraction of worldwide
debt for parents in the two credit positions was significant at the ten percent level.
29The difference in the mean values of FAIWWA between parents in the two credit positions
in 1990 was statistically significant at a ten percent level.
30Recall that the four sample years are not consecutive.17
1986 was 31 percent for all multinationals. This rate was only 15 percent for firms in excess
credits in all four years.3' A higher cost of U.S. debt due to the interest allocation rules could
be partially responsible for this result.
We next focus on the growth rates of debt abroad. The theory suggests that, holding all
other factors constant, the growth rate of debt in each of the three countries should be higher
for those firms that are always in excess credit positions. However, table 4 presents evidence
that this is only the case for Japan. As mentioned above, we attempt to control for some country
specific effects in our econometric work.
As is shown in the technical appendix, the interest allocation rules increase the cost of
debt finance at home for firms with excess credits. Using a much larger dataset, Frootand
Hines (1994) find that the change in overall debt for firms with high foreign toworldwide asset
ratios is significantly less for those firms in excess credit positions than those in excesslimitation
positions. In table 5 we control for differences in foreign toworldwide asset ratios. Before
turning to that analysis, note that table 4 provides evidence thatis consistent with Froot and
Hines (1994). The growth rate of worldwide debt for parents in excess credits forall four years
is 11 percent as compared to the 31 percent growth rate for our alternative groupof parents.32
This difference in growth rates suggests that the interest allocation rules mayhave led to an
increase in the use of other non-debt sources of finance.33
31The difference in the growth rates is statistically significant at a ten percentlevel.
32The difference in growth rates is statistically significant at the ten percentlevel.
"See Collins and Shackelford (1992) for an investigation of the impactof interest allocation
on the issuance of preferred stock.18
Up to this point the analysis has ignored the impactof the ratio of foreign to worldwide
assets on the tax advantage of U.S. debt. Recall that theincrease in the cost of U.S. debt is an
increasing function of the ratio of net foreign assets toworldwide assets (FA/WWA). This
suggests that the interest allocation rules will have adifferential impact on multinationals with
high versus low ratios of foreign to worldwide assets.Table 5presentsevidence that is
consistent with this prediction. We divide parents into two groups based onFA/WWA. Debt
to asset ratios and growth rates of debt are then calculated separatelyfor parents above and
below the median value of FA/WWA in 1986. Parents above the median experienced
significantly higher growth rates of debt in all three countries. In addition,these parents had
growth rates of U.S. debt and worldwide debt that were significantlylower than those below the
median.
The results presented in table 5arequite strong.' As mentioned above, all of the
multinationals in our sample were adversely affected by the changes in the interest allocation
rules at some point during our sample period. As a result it is difficult to divide the sample
based on whether the interest allocation rules are relevant. However, there is variation in the
ratio of foreign to worldwide assets. Table 5 makes use of this variation and demonstrates that
there is a negative correlation between growth rates of U.S. debt and FA/WWA and a positive
correlation between growth rates of foreign debt and FAIWWA.
'The difference in mean growth rates of debt for parents with FA/WWA above and below
the median was statistically significant at the ten percent level for U.S. and worldwide debt.19
3.3Regression Analysis
In the regression analysis that follows we treat the country data reported for subsidiaries
located in Canada,Japan andthe U.K. by each parent corporation as an observation. This
means that for each year there are three observations for every parent. Since there are eight
parents with information on FA/WWA, three countries and four years, this procedureleaves us
with 96 observations (=8*3*4).
In this section, we attempt to measure the impact of the interest allocation rules on debt
levels abroad. Our theoretical model suggests that for parent corporations with excess credits
the percentage of overall debt held in a particular host country should be an increasing function
of FAIWWA, all else equal. This ratio should have less of an impact on the debt location
decisions of parents in excess limitation.36
As explained in the technical appendix, host country borrowing may also be sensitive to
differences between home and host country tax rates and nominal interest rates. A marginal
dollar of debt at home lowers the tax bill in country jbyiuwherei,equalsthe nominal interest
rate and u1isthe corporate statutory tax rate in country j.37Thesame increase in debt at home
decreases taxes in the U.S. by iuwherei is the nominal interest rate and uisthe corporate
35By treating the data in this way, we are assuming that each parent has only one subsidiary
in each of the three countries for which data is reported. In fact, the parent companies were
asked to aggregate information from their ten largest subsidiaries in each of the threecountries.
36The interest allocation rules may impact excess limitation firms that expect to transit to
excess credit positions.
37The true cost of debt finance in a foreign country is d =i,(l-u,)-i withir denoting the
rate of inflation. If it is assumed that real interest rates are the same acrosscountries, then i -
= rfor all countries. By substitution, we obtain d =r- Subtracting this expression
from a similar one obtained for the U.S., we obtain the expression iu-iu.20
statutory tax rate in the U.S. This intuition suggests thatlocal borrowing in host country j
shouldbe an increasing function of i,u, -iu.This relationship does not hold for multinationals
that are not tax paying either at home or abroad, however. Consider a parent corporation that
has a zero tax bill in host country j.Additionalinterest deductions have a tax value that is less
thansince interest deductions are only written off when the firm becomes tax paying through
carryforward provisions. The present value of interest deductions is also less than iu for parents
that do not pay taxes at home due to losses. This suggests that we should treat parents with
losses at home and/or abroad differently in our regression equation.3 We do this by
calculating the following explanatory variable for each country-specific observation of parent k:
BenefituJiJ.(l-TkJ) -ui(l-Tk)
where3'
j = subsidiarylocation subscript (j =Canada, Japan, or the U.K.),
k= parentsubscript,
u= theoverall corporate tax rate in country i
40
= thenominal interest rate in country j,
38Sincewe do not have information on tax loss carryforwards of the parent corporations at
home or of subsidiaries abroad, we treat losses as if there were no carryover provisions. This
is equivalent to assuming that losses cannot be carried back and carryforwards expire unused.
39For simplicity, we suppress subscripts for time.
°The overall foreign and U.S. corporate tax rates are inclusive of state and local taxes. The
rates used in the regressions are presented in the data appendix.
41The nominal interest rates are taken from OECD (1992). Appendix table 1 reports these
rates for the four sample years.21
TkJ= a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if taxes paidin country j by
subsidiaries of parentkare less than or equal to zero and takes the value of 0
otherwise,
u = the overall corporate tax rate in the U.S.,
i = the nominal interest rate in the U.S.,
Tk a dummy variable that takes the value of I if taxes paidin the U.S. by parent k
are less than or equal to zero and takes the value of 0 otherwise,
Note that the benefit variable takes into account changes in statutory tax ratesand exchange rates
(resulting from shifts in anticipated inflation rates across countries).These factors influence debt
decisions in addition to the interest allocation rules.
We start by estimating the following equation:
DkJWWDk=IBenefit(ECk)+ 2BenefitkJ(l-ECk) + I33ECk
+ 4FAk/WWAk + fl(FA/WWAkXECk) + MANk + (5)
where
DkJ = debt holdings of subsidiaries located in country j remitted to parent k,
WWDk = worldwide debt of parent k,
ECk = a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if parentk is in an excess
credit position and zero otherwise,
Industry = a set of industry specific variables for parent k,and
= an error term.
For expositional ease, we suppress parent subscripts in the followingdiscussion.22
The industry variable in equation (5) is designed to control for factors explaining debt
location decisions that differ across industries. In our regressions we use a dummy variable,
NMAN, that takes the value of one if the parent company is in the non-manufacturing sectorand
zero otherwise. This specification is meant to capture differencesin the riskiness of foreign debt
for manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.
This formulation allows us to distinguish between the impact on D/WWD of the interest
allocation variable, (FAIWWA)(EC), and FA/WWA. In addition, equation (5)takesinto
account that the tax benefit term may have a different impact on firms depending on their foreign
tax credit status. Recall, that firms in excess credit positions do not pay U.S. taxes on foreign
earnings. Higher deductions in countries with corporate tax rates that exceed U.S. tax rates
could decrease worldwide taxes. This points to a positive relationship between the tax benefit
variable and the dependent variable for firms in excess credit positions. However, this is not
necessarily the case for firms in excess limitation positions. Consider the tax bill of a subsidiary
of a parent in excess limitation located in a high tax country. An increase in interest deductions
will decrease foreign after-tax income and foreign tax credits which would no longer be used
to shelter other sources of low-tax income being remitted to the U.S.42 This argument points
to a negative relationship between Benefit and D,/WWD for parents in excess limitation
positions.
Table 6 contains our regression results. The first column reports the coefficients for
equation (5). Neither the EC dummy variable or the interest allocation variable are statistically
42This argument depends on the ability of U.S. multinationals to average high and low tax
income for the purpose of the foreign tax credit. For a theoretical derivation of the debt
decision in the case of excess limitation, see Hines (1992) and Leechor and Mintz (1993):23
significant.43 At the same time, the FA/WWAvariable is significant. The coefficient on
FA/WWA indicates that a ten percent increase in FA/WWAwould lead to a .048 increase in
foreign subsidiary debt relative to worldwidedebt. This is quite large relative to the mean value
of .105 for DIWWD.Noticealso that the benefit variables are significant and havethe
predicted signs.
The remaining columns in table 6 contain the results of aseries of revisions to equation
(5).Incolumn (2) we experiment with a specification that allowsFA/WWA to impact the local
borrowing decisions of subsidiaries with parents inboth credit positions. All of the variables
in this equation are statistically significant different from zeroat the ten percent level or lower.
These results suggest that the interest allocation rules are importantto the local borrowing
decisions of all subsidiaries regardless of the credit positionof the parent.45 Given that all of
the subsidiaries in our sample were associated with parentsthat were in excess credits for at least
one year, this result is not surprising. On theother hand, there could be other factors besides
the interest allocation rules that lead to a positive correlationbetween FAfWWA and local debt.
Our last specification replaces current with lagged valuesof FA/WWA since this variable
may not be exogenous todecisions concerning the location of debt. The results incolumn (3)
are similar to those discussed above. Thebenefit variables are no longer significant and have
43These results could be driven by the fact that 73 percentof the observations are associated
with parents in excess credits.
"Also note that the coefficients are quite large.
To interpret these results, consider a ten percent increase inFAIWWA. For parents in
excess credit (limitation) positions, this increasewould lead to a .053 (.057) increase in the ratio
of foreign subsidiary debt to worldwide debt. This is quite largein relation to the average value
of .117 (.068) for DJ/WWD for subsidiaries with parentsin excess credits (limitation).24
smaller coefficients than those in columns (1) and (2).The interest allocation vasiable is
significant for subsidiaries with parents in bothcredit states. However, consistent with the
theory, the coefficient on FAIWWA is larger forsubsidiaries associated with parents in excess
credits.
Our work with the Price Waterhouse survey supports the following conclusions:
i. The growth rate in foreign debt as a percentage of worldwide debt differedfor firms in the
two foreign tax credit positions. The sum of debt in Canada, Japan,and the U.K as a
proportion of worldwide debt was 8.7 percent for firms with excesscredits in 1986. By 1990,
debt in these three countries as a proportion of worldwide debt had increas by25 percent for
firms with excess credits. For firms in excess limitation positions, the proportionof debt in the
three countries in our sample decreased by 52 percent from 1986 to 1990. This suggeststhat
the firms in our sample have altered the location of debt in response to TRA'86.
ii. The effect of the interest allocation rules on U.S. debt to asset ratios is strongest for those
multinational corporations with high foreign to worldwide asset ratios. The growth in U.S. debt
between 1986 and 1991 relative to U.S. assets in 1986 was 15 percent for those corporations
with high foreign asset to worldwide asset ratios in 1986. The growth rate of U.S. debt for
firms with low foreign to worldwide assets ratios in 1986 was 39 percent. This also suggests
an impact of the new interest allocation rules on the location of borrowing.25
iii.As explained in the text, firms with excess credits lose a dollar's worth of interest
deductions for every dollar of U.S. interest expense abroad. We find that thisallocation of
interest expenseincreasesthe marginal cost of U.S. debt by about 38 percent for these firms.
We estimate that the interest allocation rules increased the U.S. tax paymentsof firms with
excess credits by about 50 percent.
These results suggest that the new interest allocation rules have distorted the financingdecisions
of U.S. multinationals. Without taxes, firms issue debt in countries tominimize the cost of
funds including bankruptcy and transations costs. With the new interest allocation rules,at least
for the firms in our sample, this choice is distorted. This distortion induces a potentially large
efficiency cost.
4.THE IMPACT OF THEINTERESTALLOCATION RULES ON
COMPETiTIVENESS
With global economic integration, the impact of government tax policies onthe ability
of U.S. multinationals to compete in domestic and foreign markets is an importantconsideration
for tax policy analysis. To determine the impact of interest allocationrules on competitiveness,
we estimate the effect of these rules on the effective tax rateof foreign or domestic investments
undertaken by U.S. multinationals. These comparisons also allow one toexamine the impact
of interest allocation rules on the competitiveness of U.S. and foreign firms,assuming that the
firms have similar investment projects and debt/equity ratios. Foreignmultinationals operating
in either the United States or their own country are less likely to facerestrictions on their ability26
todeductinterestincurred to finance domestic or foreigninvestments. Thus, the effective
tax rate for foreign firmswould be the one calculatedforthe "no interest allocation" case.
The effective tax rate that ismeasured below is the amount of corporate tax paid on
income generated by the lastunit of, or marginal, investment made bythe U.S. company at
home or abroad41. It is a summarymeasure that takes into account varioustax provisions that
affect the cost of capital such asthe corporate income tax rate, depreciationallowances and, in
this paper, interest allocation rules.For example, suppose that the requirednet-of-tax rate of
return on capital for internationalinvestors is 6 percent. A corporation thatoffers a net-of-tax
rate of return on capital below6 percent would not be able to obtain financing.Suppose further
that the effective tax rate on the return oncapital is 40 percent. For a u.s.corporation to
attract financing for a marginal project,it must earn a before-tax rate of returnof capital at least
equal to 10 percent forinternational investors to earn a rate of return oncapital equal to 6
percent, net of taxes. Therefore,the effective tax rate on marginal investmentsis indicative of
how much the tax system can affect theinvestment decisions of a firm.
In the attached technical appendix, we
derive expressions for the effective tax rate on
U.S. domestic and foreign investmentsin the presence of interest allocation rules.It is assumed
that the u.s. multinational is in an excess taxcredit position so that interest allocationrules
would reduce the amount of U.S.-source interest expensethat can be taken against domestic
United States, similar to a number of other jurisdictionssuch as Germany and Canada, has
a "thin capitalization" rule thatrestricts the ability of a foreign-owned corporationto deduct
interest expense against U.S. taxable incomewhen debt deductions surpass a certainlimit.
47The methodology follows Boadway, Bruceand Mintz (1984) for an open economy.A
similar methodology may be found in Kingand Fullerton (1984), AuerbaCh (1983)and more
recently Bovenberg et al (1990) andOECD (1991).27
income.We also assumein the model that the U.S. parent or subsidiary operating in a foreign
country invests in depreciable capital(machineryand buildings) using either equity (retentions
or new equity) or debt as finance. Debt is assumed to be fungible across countries; however,
the parent and subsidiary bonds are not perfect substitutes as there are country-specific
transaction and bankruptcy costs that affect corporate bond rates. Inflation rates differ across
countries which in turn influences the appreciation or devaluation of the exchange rate of a
country relative to that of the United States.
The estimates of effective tax rates are based on 1993 tax provisions, interest and
inflation rates in the United States, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom (see the data
appendix for further details on parameters). The amount of U.S. interest allocated to foreign
sources is taken to be 34.6 percent, based on the average amount of interest allocated by the
non-financial companies in our data set.
In Table 7, we provide estimates of effective tax rates on U.S. multinational investments
that are made in either the United States, Canada, Japan or the United Kingdom. In the first
column, we calculate the effective tax rates assuming that interest is allocated. The second
column provides the effective tax rate when interest is not allocated. The difference in the two
columns is presented in the third column.
As is illustrated in Table 7, the requirement to allocate interest expense has a significant
impact on the effective tax rate faced by U.S. multinationals. For U.S. domestic investments,
the interest allocation rules increase the U.S. effective rate from 17.6 percent to 21.9 percent.
The effect of interest allocation rules is to result in some of the interest that is used for domestic
investments to be allocated to foreign income. Effectively, the U.S. multinational cannot deduct28
all its borrowed financing expenses, unlike a corporation that need not allocate U.S. interest
expense.
For foreign investments, the effect of the interest allocation rules is even more dramatic.
The effect of interest allocation is to increase the effective tax rate on Canadian investment made
by U.S. companies by almost 8 percentage points for both manufacturing and non-manufacturing
companies. The effective tax rate on Japanese investment for U.S. multinationals increases from
18.0 percent to 28.3 percent. The effective tax rate on U.K. investments rises from 17.4
percent to 26.5 percent. If it is assumed that foreign firms do not allocate interest, then U.S.
multinational companies.are significantly disadvantaged from a tax point of view.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The results of our empirical work suggest that interest allocation rules have had a
significant impact on the financing of U.S. multinationals. Parents have reduced debt finance
in the U.S. in favor of debt financing of foreign affiliates. We also find that the interest
allocation rules have had a substantial impact on the effective tax rates of U.S. companies,
particularly for foreign investments. Compared to foreign companies that do not have to allocate
interest expense, U.S. companies face a tax disadvantage when undertaking new investments
since some of the debt costs may not be deductible.29
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX
This appendix provides the background theory needed to determine the impact of interest
allocation rules on the financing and investment decisions. The model is based on a two period
formulation of investment and financing decisions of the multinational. It is assumed that the
multinational invests in productive opportunities in the U.S. and a foreign country (below, a *
willdenote foreign values). Either the parent or subsidiary may borrow debt. It is assumed that
parent and subsidiary debt are not perfect substitutes or fully fungible. This assumption arises
from the performance and regulation of national capital markets which result in lenders looking
at the parent and foreign affiliate on their own terms even though the subsidiary may have
guarantees of the parent. The implication of this assumption is that bankruptcy and other
attendant transaction costs associated with debt financing depends on the parent and foreign
affiliate's own leverage. In addition, the multinational pays taxes to the U.S. and foreign
countries on income generated by investments. It is assumed for U.S. tax purposes that interest
is allocated abroad and the multinational is in an excess credit position (as described in the text).
In the first period, the multinational invests in capital in the U.S., equal to K, and
abroad, equal to K*. It is assumed that the price of capital in each country is unity in the initial
period. By investing in capital, the firm will obtain a stream of capital cost deductions that
reduces the effective purchase price of capital. Let Z and Z* be the present value of capital cost
deductions in the U.S. and foreign country respectively. The tax value of capital cost deductions
is uZ in the U.S. and u*Z* in the foreign country, u and u' denoting the U.S. and foreign32
corporate tax rates respectively. The multinational borrows funds in the U.S. equal to B and
in the foreign country equal to B*.
In the second period, the multinational earns income and sells off its investment in each
country. Foreign values are converted into U.S. dollars by using the exchange rate, denoted by
x. The foreign currency is expected to appreciate relative to the U.S. dollar according to
purchasing price parity. This implies that x =(l+i.)/(l+T*),r anddenoting the rate of
inflation in the U.S. and foreign country, respectively.
Second period returns earned on U.S. investments are equal to nominal revenues,
(1+i)F{KJ, net of interest expense on U.S. debt, i[y]B, and U.S. taxes, T. The production
function for output, F[K], is strictly concave. The nominal interest rate on debt, i['y] is a rising
function of the debt-asset ratio of the U.S. parent, to be explained more fully below. In
addition, the firm cashes in the value of its capital at the end of the second period. The value
of the firm is the undepreciated replacement cost of capital. Letting denote the percentage
amount of capital that has physically depreciated, the replacement price of capital is
(l-)K(l +i'),assumingthe price of capital rises with the general rate of inflation, i'Debt
is also retired. A similar set of assumptions apply to the subsidiary with all values denoted by
*andconverted into U.S. dollars.
As for taxes paid to the U.S. government, the corporate tax base is equal to revenues net
of interest expense and depreciation. Thus, the after tax revenues are equal to (l-u)(l +x-)F[K]
and after tax cost of interest expense, without interest allocation, is equal to i(1-u). However,
'It is trivial to allow the capital good price to rise by a rate different than the general rate
of inflation. One could instead think of 5 as the rate of physical depreciation net of real capital
gains earned by holding the asset K.33
since interest is allocated to the foreign subsidiary, only i(l-cr) of interest expense is deductible
from U.S. tax with a denoting the proportion of allocated interest expense based on ratio of
foreign net assets to total worldwide assets of the parent:(K*B*)/(K*B*+K). Since we
have included the present value of depreciation deductions in the first period, we note that, when
the firm sells off its assets, it loses the value of the future stream of tax depreciation. Thus, the
liquidating value of the firm is L =(l +7)(1-)K(1-uZ).2
As mentioned above, the interest rate is assumed to be a rising function of the debt asset
ratio (y) of the company. If the firm is liquidated, the value of assets is equal to K( 1 -uZ) (after
replacement of depreciated capital with income). We therefore assume that the interest costs on
debt rise depending on the ratio, =B/K(1-uZ).
The multinational chooses the optimal amount of capital and debt to issue in the U.S. and
foreign country to maximize the value of its investment. Letting pequalthe shareholders'





withY =(I-u)(l+r)F[K]-i[y](1-u(1-a)B +(1-ô)(l+)K(1-uZ) -B
Y1 =(1_u*)(1+7*)F[K*]_j*[y*](l..u*)B* +(1_&)(1+i.*)K*(lu*Z*) -B*
a= (K*B*)/(K*_B*K),y =B/(K(l-uZ)),y*= B*/(K*(1u*Z*)).
Thefirst order conditions yield the following results:
21n principle, recapture of depreciation rules may result in the gain or loss to be treated as
income and fully taxed rather than a reduction in a future stream of capital cost deductions.
However, we are using this "static model to capture in a simple way the dynamic one in which
firms operate over a long period of time. The model outlined here provides the same results as
the dynamic one.34
(i) Choice of FinancinE
The firm issues debt in the U.S. until the after tax cost of interest is equal to the
opportunity cost of equity (p):
p =(i+i"y)(l-u(l-a))(with i' =8iIô'). (2)
Foreign debt is issued until its after tax cost is equal to opportunity cost of equity:
p =(j*+i*y*)(lu*) -ui(l-a)2(B/Kx). (3)
Note that the first term is the after tax cost of debt (in absence of interest allocation). The
second term is the tax savings arising from issuing debt in the foreign country rather than the
United States. This term reduces the cost of debt finance in the foreign country. If all U.S.
source interest in the U.S. is allocated abroad (a= 1),then there is no advantage to issuing debt
in the foreign country to reduce the impact of the interest allocation rule faced by the parent.
(ii)The Investment Decision in the U.S.
The cost of capital for the parent's investment in the United States is the following:
(6+rf)(l—UZ) (4)
(1-u)
where r, =(l-y)r+ [7/(l+i)]{i(1-u(l-a2)-1}.
The cost of capital is similar to the usual one found in the literature. The only difference being
that the cost of debt finance is higher resulting from the allocation of U.S. interest expense to
the foreign subsidiary. If no interest is allocated (a= 0),the U.S. company would be able to
deduct the full cost of interest expense from taxable income. The term I -cr2reflectsthe overall
impact of the capital investment on interest allocation. Vhen the firm raises one unit of capital35
stock, it finances investment by y units of debt with tax relief equal to (l-a)u. On the other
hand, by increasing capital stock, the proportion of U.S. interest allocated abroad declines. The
combination of the two effects results in the tax value of interest deductions being equal to
ui(1-a2).
(iii)The Investment Decision in the Foreign Country
The cost of capital for the foreign affiliate is determined as follows:
/(ô+r) 5 F = (1uZ)+R ( )
(1-u)
where rj =(1_,*)r+[*/(1+i.*)]{i*(1_u*)_i.*}and
R= uiy(1—u)2(1—uZ) (1—y(1—u'Z') }
(1+) (1 —u)
The cost of capital for the foreign affiliate is adjusted by adding on the term, R, which is the
interest allocation tax penalty resulting from additional capital expenditure made by the foreign
affiliate. The amount of U.S. source interest that is allocated to the foreign affiliate depends on
net assets of the foreign affiliate. When the foreign affiliate increases its capital expenditure,
it increases U.S. interest expense allocated abroad. On the other hand, part of the foreign
affiliate's capital expenditure is financed by additional debt (y*(1u*Z*) =B*/K*)which
reduces the amount of allocated U.S. interest. However, given that B* is likely less than K*,
then R >0.36
DATAAPPENDIX
Much of the data used in this paper were assembled from a survey conducted by Price
Waterhouse for this project. In the first section of this appendix we provide information on the
surveydata weused in the analysis. Notes on the data used to calculate effective tax rates
appears in the second section.
A. The Price Waterhouse Survey
As mentioned in the paper, the survey data comes from tax forms and annual reports.
The following list describes the source of the data used to construct tables I through 5.
1. Information from the tax form filed to claim a foreign tax credit (Form 1118).'
a. Total taxable income from all sources. This variable was used to determine
whether the parent corporation was taxable in the year in question.
b. Foreign tax credit limitation.
c. Foreign tax credit. To determine the credit position of the parent, we compared
the foreign tax credit claimed to the foreign tax credit limitation. If the foreign
tax credit equalled the limitation, the parent was in excess credits in the year in
question.
2. Information from the information form filed for controlled foreign corporations of U.S.
parent companies (Form 5471).2
a. Taxes. This variable was used to determine whether subsidiaries were taxable in
the year in question.
'The survey requested multinationals to report information from their "primary basket." For
the non-financial companies used in this study, this would be the overall basket.
2Price Waterhouse collected information from these forms by country. Multinationals were
instructed to aggregate information for their ten largest subsidiaries if more than one Form 5471
was filed for a particular country. The multinationals were asked to provide information for
Canada, Japan, and the U.K.37
b. Assets.
c. Short- and long-term debt.





e. U.S. interest expense.
This information was used to calculate the ratio of foreign to worldwide assets for the
purpose of interest allocation. The formula is:
FA/WWA =(WWA-U.S.assets -FD)/(WWA-FD)
whereFD =foreigndebt
=worldwidedebt -U.S.debt, FA =foreignassets,
WWA =worldwideassets.
B. Effective Tax Rates
Data used for effective tax rate calculations included the following:
Corporate Tax Rates: See the table below. Includes tax rates on income at federal, state and
local government levels. Primary source of information was taken from the International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation.
Tax Depreciation Rates: Data on average tax depreciation rates for machinery and structures
are based on OECD (1991) (information for updating rates were taken from International Bureau
of Fiscal Documentation or Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1992)). Present value calculations include
adjustments for the half-year convention in Canada and United States.
Economic Depreciation Rates: Economic depreciation rates for structures are assumed to be 4%
and for machinery 16% (exponential). Taken from Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1992).
Cost of Finance: Corporate long term interest rates and consumer price inflation rates were
taken from IMP statistics. The real riskiess cost of equity finance was assumed to be 3% in all
countries. The risk component associated with equity finance was assumed to reflect "income
risk'. The cost of debt finance was augmented for bankruptcy costs.38
Debt-Asset Ratio:Debt-assetratio, priortoan adjustment for tax depreciation recapture (see
technical appendix), was 38.4% for ail investments in all countries. Taken from U.S. and
Canadian data (see Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1992)).
Capital Stock Weights: Proportion of investments in structures (35%) and machinery (65%)
were assumed to be the same for all countries. Data taken from Mintz and Tsiopoulos (1992)
for manufacturing companies.Appendix Table1
Country TaxRates and Nominal Interest Rates
1986 1988 1990 1991
Canada
overall tax rate 42.73 39.66 37.65 37.05
nominal interestrate 9.54 10.23 10.79 9.81
Japan
overall tax rate 58.56 57.20 52.49 52.49
nominal interestrate 4.94 4.27 7.36 6,53
U.K.
overall tax rate 36.25 35.00 35.00 35.00
nominal interestrate 9.87 9.36 11.08 9.92
U.S.
overall tax rate 49.46 38.23 38.23 38.23
nominal interestrate 8.14 8.97 8.73 8.16
Notes:
1. Tax rates for Canada apply to manufacturing firms.
2. Overall tax rates include state and local taxes.
3. Long-term interest rates are reported.
39Table 1
Annual Report Information
AverageValues (in millionsof dollars)
1986 1988 1990 1991
Assets
Worldwide 37,515 52,356 60,067 62,716
U.S. 21,900 37,214 40,549 42,897
Ratio U.S/Worldwide 0.58 0.71 0.67 0.68
Debt (short and long term)
Worldwide 8,644 18,217 21,065 22,541
U.S. 7,758 6,674 11,118 15,647
Ratio U.S/Worldwide 0.85 0.34 0.49 0.65
Pre-tax Income
Worldwide 2,409 3,399 2,835 1,559
U.S. 1,077 1,476 1,077 181
Ratio U.S/Worldwide 0.45 0.43 0.38 0.17
Income tax
Worldwide (U.S. and foreign) 888 1,233 1,203 771
U.S. (on worldwide income) 238 432 432 196
Ratio U.S/Worldwide 0.27 0.35 0.36 0.27
Interest expense
Worldwide 745 1,855 2,347 2,258
U.S. 647 657 1,164 1,656





Dus/Woridwide Debt 84 0.719 0.020
Parents in excess credits 66 0.706 0.024
Parents in excess limitation 18 0.767 0.037
D1/Worldwide Debt 52 0.091 0.0 14
Parents in excess credits 36 0.106 0.019
Parents in excess limitation 16 0.058 0.013
D/Worldwide Debt 52 0.075 0.013
Parents in excess credits 36 0.081 0.0 16
Parents in excess limitation 16 0.061 0.026
Du/Worldwide Debt 52 0.115 0.020
Parents in excess credits 36 0.138 0.028
Parents in excess limitation 16 0.064 0.015
(Dn+Djap*i+Du)IWorldwide Debt 156 0.094 0.009
Parents in excess credits 108 0.108 0.012
Parents in excess limitation 48 0.061 0.011
FA/WWA 96 0.346 0.017
Parents in excess credits 72 0.377 0.02 1
Parents in excess limitation 24 0.255 0.021
FA/WWA*U.S. interest expense
Parents in excess credits 72 $401,915 $88,916
Note: U.S. debt figures are only available for eight parent corporations.
41Table 3
Pre-TRA'86 and Post-TRA'86 debt and asset ratios
1990-1986
1986 1990 1986
1. Debt In U.S./Worldwide debt
Parents in excess credits 0.603 0.694 0.15 1
Parents in excess limitation 0.736 0.902 0.226
2. Debt in Canada/Worldwide debt
Parents in excess credits 0.063 0.122 0.937
Parents in excess limitation 0.037 0.072 0.945
3. Debt in Japan/Worldwide debt
Parents in excess credits 0.035 0.077 1.200
Parents in excess limitation 0.169 0.019 -0.888
4. Debt in U.K./Worldwide debt
Parents in excess credits 0.163 0.127 -0.221
Parents in excess limitation 0.109 0.060 -0.450
5.[(2)+ (3) + (4)1/Worldwide debt
Parents in excess credits 0.087 0.109 0.253
Parents in excess limitation 0.105 0.050 -0.524
6.Foreignassets/Worldwide assets
Parents in excess credits 0.327 0.445 0.361
Parents in excess limitation 0.328 0.277 -0.155
42Table 4
Debt growth rates by foreign tax credit status





Canada 0.19 0.44 5.77
Japan 0.43 0.47 0.57
U.K. 0.45 0.43 1.59
U.S. 0.26 0.37 0.31
Worldwide 0.24 0.30 0.26
For parents in excess credits
in all tour years:
Canada 0.14 0.48 1.88
Japan 0.42 0.56 1.05
U.K. 0.62 0.53 0.31
U.S. 0.20 0.32 0.15
Worldwide 0.25 0.29 0.11
For parents in excess
limitation for at least one
year:
Canada 0.21 0.42 6.94
Japan 0.43 0.44 0.41
U.K. 0.40 0.40 1.97
U.s. 0.28 0.40 0.39
Worldwide 0.24 0.30 0.31
43Table S
Debt growth rates by foreign to worldwide asset ratios










Canada 0.16 0.29 16.05
Japan 0.30 0.48 0.84
U.K. 0.38 0.46 0.40
U.s. 0.20 0.32 0.15





Canada 0.25 0.47 0.66
Japan 0.45 0.43 0.21
U.K. 0.28 0.28 0.02
U.s. 0.28 0.40 0.39
Worldwide 0.32 0.34 0.25
Note: The data consists of four parents with FA/WWA above the median and four
below the median for 1986.
44Table 6





































Adjusted R2 .3824 .3881 .3898
F statistic 10.804 13.053 10.070
No. of observations 96 96 72
Explanatory variables are defined in the text. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
+indicatesthat the coefficient in statistically significant from zero at at least the
10 percent level of significance.
45Table 7





















Japan 28.3% 18.0% 10.3%
United Kingdom 26.5% 17.4% 9.1%
46